SSH, Actually 100% signal, 0% noise.

Hardware Keys for SSH

concept
depth 4/4 − deeper + surface

Hardware SSH keys don't change the cryptography. They change where authentication memory lives. Everything else follows from that.

Why hardware-backed SSH feels strange: with web auth, you visit a site, the browser handles everything, the key just "works." With SSH, there are files in ~/.ssh/, some are called "blobs," others "stubs," terms like "resident" and "non-resident" appear, and it's not clear what goes where or why.

The confusion comes from one shift:

Hardware keys change where authentication state lives.

Traditional SSH puts all state on disk—the private key file is the full secret, copyable, losable. Hardware-backed SSH splits state between your computer and the hardware key. That split is the entire design.

Mechanically, modern SSH simply reuses FIDO2 hardware keys as signing devices—the ed25519-sk key type uses FIDO2 as a signing oracle. SSH predates all of the modern web-auth machinery: it already uses key-pair cryptography, already knows the username, and does not need discovery. This is why SSH keys, WebAuthn, and passkeys feel related—they are.

Where state lives, side by side:

Traditional SSH (disk-based key)

[ Your Computer ]
┌──────────────────────────┐
│ private_key (FULL SECRET)│  ← copyable
│ passphrase (optional)    │
└──────────────────────────┘

Hardware-backed SSH

[ Your Computer ]           [ Hardware Key ]
┌──────────────────┐       ┌────────────────┐
│ stub / handle    │──────▶│ slot (SECRET)  │
│ (no secret)      │       │ PIN / touch    │
└──────────────────┘       └────────────────┘

With the disk key: lose the file → access is gone; copy the file → attacker can authenticate. With the hardware key: the secret never becomes a file, the computer cannot authenticate alone, and physical presence is required every time.

Two concepts carry the whole model from here: state (anything that must be remembered for authentication to keep working) and slots (the scarce protected storage inside the device). The two kinds of hardware SSH key—resident and non-resident—are just two answers to "which side of the split holds the state?"

The takeaway:

Hardware-backed SSH is not about stronger math. It is about strictly controlling where state is allowed to exist.

The cryptographic strength of an ed25519-sk key and a disk-based ed25519 key is the same. What differs is the failure modes. A disk key's state is a file—so its threats are file threats: malware copies it, backups leak it, theft plus a weak passphrase compromises it. A hardware-backed key's secret lives where no copy operation exists—so its threats become physical ones: lose the device (recoverable, if you planned), or lose the non-secret file the device needs (recoverable or permanent, depending on key type).

Once you understand state and slots, everything else—resident keys, non-resident keys, stubs, blobs, PINs—becomes a detail, not a mystery.