The MFA Strength Ladder
conceptA rough ordering of MFA methods from worst to best, ranked by one question: how hard is it for a motivated, competent attacker—who already knows your username—to successfully impersonate you?
The ladder, worst to best:
| # | Method | Why it sits here |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | Email link | Email accounts are often already compromised, logged in on many devices, and themselves protected by weak or reused credentials. If an attacker controls your email, this "factor" collapses entirely. |
| 2 | SMS code | Vulnerable to SIM-swapping, carrier attacks, interception, and social engineering. The phone number—not the physical device—is the security anchor: a fundamental design flaw. |
| 3 | Authenticator app (TOTP) | Codes are short-lived and not transmitted over the network, but still phishable and replayable—an attacker who tricks you into entering the code can immediately use it. |
| 4 | Enterprise time-based tokens | Short validity windows, device management, logging, rapid revocation—but usually still code-based, so real-time phishing remains possible. |
| 5 | Biometrics (local) + WebAuthn | The biometric doesn't authenticate you to the service—it unlocks a local authenticator, which proves identity cryptographically. The biometric never leaves the device. |
| 6 | Passkeys | Passwords eliminated entirely; authentication by cryptographic signature, not shared secrets. Phishing-resistant, device-bound—but the platform controls creation, syncing, and recovery. |
| 7 | Hardware security keys | Secrets never leave the hardware, authentication requires physical touch, attempts are rate-limited, and phishing fails because the device verifies the service before signing anything. |